"Does Social Cohesion Reduce Electoral Fraud? Evidence from Algeria"
Using data from an original survey (N=1,000) in Algeria, I measure two kinds of fraud --election rigging and vote buying –- and explain their subnational variation. My analysis shows that authoritarian officials are less likely to employ fraud in the presence of extensive local associations. This result supports my argument that social cohesion facilitates the flow of information and, in turn, encourages collective action. In areas where fraud is more likely to lead to anti-government demonstrations, officials rely on it less. To provide causal evidence, I employ an exogenous predictor -- the extent of Algerian education during the French colonial era –- to disentangle the relationship between social cohesion and fraud. I further argue that regime unpopularity, operationalized as civil war deaths, decreases vote buying, but not election rigging. I suggest that incumbents perceive vote buying as an effective strategy in areas where they still have some popular support, it may not guarantee election victories in places where popularity is low. My research explores ways of measuring fraud through incorporating a randomized-response technique and a list experiment in surveys.
"The Politics of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Regimes: Cross-National Evidence"
"Diwaniyya, International Legitimacy, and Electoral Integrity in Kuwait"
"Gender Quotas and Electoral Survival in Autocracies"
"Are Authoritarian Elections Good for Citizens? Electoral Institutions and Mass Repression in Dictatorships" (with Chao-yo Cheng, UCLA)
Other Writings
“The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait: Social Activism to Political Prominence.” Memo prepared for the Workshop on Islamists and Local Politics Conference, Program on Governance and Local Development and Project on Middle East Political Science, Brastad, Sweden, June 13-15, 2017.
“Kuwaitis voted Saturday. Opposition gains send a strong signal about the economy.” The Washington Post, Monkey Cage. November 29, 2016, with Marwa Shalaby (Rice)
Using data from an original survey (N=1,000) in Algeria, I measure two kinds of fraud --election rigging and vote buying –- and explain their subnational variation. My analysis shows that authoritarian officials are less likely to employ fraud in the presence of extensive local associations. This result supports my argument that social cohesion facilitates the flow of information and, in turn, encourages collective action. In areas where fraud is more likely to lead to anti-government demonstrations, officials rely on it less. To provide causal evidence, I employ an exogenous predictor -- the extent of Algerian education during the French colonial era –- to disentangle the relationship between social cohesion and fraud. I further argue that regime unpopularity, operationalized as civil war deaths, decreases vote buying, but not election rigging. I suggest that incumbents perceive vote buying as an effective strategy in areas where they still have some popular support, it may not guarantee election victories in places where popularity is low. My research explores ways of measuring fraud through incorporating a randomized-response technique and a list experiment in surveys.
"The Politics of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Regimes: Cross-National Evidence"
"Diwaniyya, International Legitimacy, and Electoral Integrity in Kuwait"
"Gender Quotas and Electoral Survival in Autocracies"
"Are Authoritarian Elections Good for Citizens? Electoral Institutions and Mass Repression in Dictatorships" (with Chao-yo Cheng, UCLA)
Other Writings
“The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait: Social Activism to Political Prominence.” Memo prepared for the Workshop on Islamists and Local Politics Conference, Program on Governance and Local Development and Project on Middle East Political Science, Brastad, Sweden, June 13-15, 2017.
“Kuwaitis voted Saturday. Opposition gains send a strong signal about the economy.” The Washington Post, Monkey Cage. November 29, 2016, with Marwa Shalaby (Rice)